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ILLINOIS ROBBERY STATUTE CONSTRUED:
THE INTRODUCTION OF A SPECIFIC INTENT
ELEMENT-PEOPLE V. WHITE
At common law and throughout the development of the criminal
law in this country, courts and legislatures have made the distinction
between general intent and specific intent crimes.' Courts, in modern times, usually have looked to statutory wording to determine
which of these categories are apposite. 2 Today, in most states, robbery is a specific intent crime, 3 either by legislative act 4 or by direct
adherence to common law without statutory definition of the crime. 5

1. People v. Hood, 1 Cal.3d 444, 456, 456 n.5, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618, 625, 625 n.5, 462 P.2d
370, 377, 377 n.5 (1969).
The line between specific and general intent is not always clearly defined, see J. HALL,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 141-45 (2d ed. 1947), but certain basic definitions can
be elicited from the cases. A general intent crime is committed by doing certain forbidden acts
while maintaining a particular level of awareness with respect to those acts. People v. Hood, 1
Cal.3d 444, 456-57, 462 P.2d 370, 377-78, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618, 625-26 (1969). See also Steele v.
State, 189 Tenn. 424, 430, 225 S.W.2d 260, 262 (1949); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-3 (1975). A
specific intent crime includes an additional element, a conscious objective to achieve some
further result at the time the proscribed acts are performed. People v. Hood, I Cal.3d 444,
456-57, 462 P.2d 370, 377-78, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618, 625-26 (1969). See also W. LAFAVE & A.
Sco'rr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 202 (1972). For example, battery is a general intent
crime, People v. Green, 130 Ill. App.2d 609, 612, 265 N.E.2d 184, 186 (2d Dist. 1970), which
is committed by one who intentionally or knowingly causes bodily harm to another. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 12-3 (1975). Burglary is a specific intent crime, People v. Loden, 27 IIl. App.3d
761, 762, 327 N.E.2d 58, 60 (2d Dist. 1975), which is committed by one who knowingly enters
a building without authority while entertaining the intent to commit a theft or felony therein.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 19-1 (1975). ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-4 (1975) provides that "a
person intends or acts intentionally or with intent . . . when his conscious objective or purpose
is to accomplish that result or engage in that conduct."
2. See, e.g., People v. Freedman, 4 1ll.2d 414, 419, 123 N.E.2d 317, 319 (1954). But see
People v. Hood, 1 Cal.3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969), in which the California
Supreme Court construed the offense of assault to be a general intent crime despite the wording of the statute which defined assault as an "attempt . . . to commit a violent injury." Id. at
457-58, 462 P.2d at 378-79, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 626-27. The court reached this conclusion based on
policy considerations involved in allowing voluntary intoxication as a defense to the crime of
assault. Since intoxicated persons are more susceptible to passion and anger than sober persons,
they are more likely to commit a crime such as assault. It would therefore be anomalous, the
court felt, to allow a defendant to raise as a defense the voluntarily induced condition which
precipitated the commission of the crime.
3. See People v. White, 40 IlI. App.3d 455, 457, 352 N.E.2d 243, 244 (1st Dist. 1976),
aff'd, 67 Ill.2d 107, 365 N.E.2d 337 (1977).
4. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17, § 3401 (1964), construed in State v. McKeogh, 300
A.2d 755 (Me. 1973); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:64 (West 1974), construed in State v. May, 339
So.2d 764 (La. 1976).
5. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 240 n.2 (1969); Burks v. Commonwealth, 259
S.W.2d 68, 70 (Ky. 1953).
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However, some state legislatures have deleted any reference to a
specific intent element in their robbery statutes and such statutes
have been construed to require only general intent. 6
In People v. White, 7 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the offenses of robbery 8 and armed robbery 9 include a specific intent element, without benefit of statutory wording to that effect. In so doing,
the court has aligned Illinois with common law' 0 and the vast majority of American jurisdictions. This inclusion of robbery in the specific
intent category will change the complexion of robbery prosecutions in
Illinois from charging through appeal and post-conviction proceedings."
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the court's opinion in White.
Particular attention will be given to the historical development of the
offense of robbery in Illinois. This Note then will criticize the court's
logic and use of precedent and attempt to forecast the impact of the
White decision on Illinois practice.
EXAMINATION OF THE COURT'S OPINION

Joseph White was convicted of armed robbery in the Circuit Court
of Cook County. The trial court, sitting without a jury, admitted the
defendant's evidence of intoxication at the time of the crime, but held
that this was not a defense to robbery.' 2 The appellate court affirmed the conviction, stating that, "[s]ince intent is not a requisite
element of the offense, . . . voluntary intoxication is not a defense to
robbery." 13 On review, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the in-

6. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-13-4-6 (Burns 1975), construed in Roberts v. State,
-Ind.-, N.E.2d 825 (1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 791 (West 1958), construed
in Traxler v. State, 96 Okla. Crim. 231, 251 P.2d 815 (1952). Cf N.Y. PENAL LAW § 160.00
(McKinney 1965) (Practice Commentaries 194-95) (statutory wording changed from "unlawful
taking" to "forcible stealing" for the express purpose of including the element of the intent to
steal lest the statute be construed to define a general intent crime).
7. 67 Ill.2d 107, 365 N.E.2d 337 (1977).
8. "A person commits robbery when he takes property from the presence or person of
another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force." ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 18-1 (1975).
9. "A person commits armed robbery when he violates section 18-1 while armed with a
dangerous weapon." Id. § 18-2.
10. See United States v. Nedley, 255 F.2d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 1958).
11. See notes 60-114 and accompanying text infra. See also 67 Ill.2d at 126, 365 N.E.2d at
347 (Dooley, J., specially concurring). Justice Dooley expressed the view that the court had
effected a far reaching and unwise change in the Criminal Code. He criticized the introduction
of the "entirely new defense" of intoxication for robbery and registered concern that this defense may be expanded to include other crimes as well.
12. 67 Ill.2d at 109, 365 N.E.2d at 338.
13. 40 I11.App.3d 455, 457, 352 N.E.2d 243, 244 (1st Dist. 1976).
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tent to permanently deprive a person of the use or benefit of the
property taken is an element of the crimes of robbery and armed
robbery. 1 4 The supreme court further held that inability to form
such intent due to voluntary intoxication is a valid defense. 15 However, White's conviction was affirmed because there was insufficient
evidence of intoxication on the record from which the trier of fact
16
could find that the defendant's intent to steal had been negated.
In arriving at these conclusions the court attempted to discern the
intentions of the drafters of the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961.17
The Committee Comments accompanying the robbery provisions of
the Code state:
This section codifies the law in Illinois on robbery and retains the
same penalty. No change is intended. .

.

. No intent element is

stated as the taking by force or threat of force is the gist of the
offense and no intent need be charged. (See People v. Emerling.
• . .)18

The Committee's citation to the 1930 Illinois case of People v.
Emerling 19 is significant. Emerling relied upon a statement made in
another Illinois robbery case, People v. Hildebrand,20 that "[n]o question of intent is involved. It is not required to be charged or

14. 67 Ill.2d at 117, 365 N.E.2d at 342.
15. Id.
16. The court focused on the defendant's demonstration of his physical and mental
capabilities at the time of the robbery. The court noted that he was mentally alert enough to
arm himself, subdue a security guard, order the hotel clerks to open the vault, and to flee upon
arrival of police. The evidence also showed that he was able to jump over a desk, retrieve
money from the cash register and climb a scaffold in attempting to escape. Id. at 120, 365
N.E.2d at 344.
Justice Dooley, in a special concurring opinion, disagreed with the majority's holdings on
the specific intent and intoxication defense issues. Justice Dooley would refuse to infer a specific
intent ingredient where the legislature has not specifically provided one. He expressed particular concern for allowing the intoxication of the defendant to excuse his actions. Id. at 126-27,
365 N.E.2d at 347 (Dooley, J., specially concurring).
17. Id. at 109-10, 365 N.E.2d at 338-39.
18. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 18-1 (Smith-Hurd 1970) (Committee Commentaries 213).
19. 341 IIl. 424, 173 N.E. 474 (1930). In Emerling the defendant was convicted of armed
robbery and on appeal contended that the jury had been erroneously instructed on the intent
element of the crime. The court affirmed the conviction holding that intent need not be charged
nor proved.
20. 307 III. 544, 139 N.E. 107 (1923). In Hildebrand the defendants were convicted of
armed robbery. On appeal it was asserted that the form of the verdict indicated that the jury
had not found that the defendants had entertained the requisite intent for armed robbery. The
defendants argued, therefore, that they had actually been found guilty of the lesser offense of
robbery and that the sentence imposed had been excessive. The court affirmed the conviction
holding that intent was not an element of armed robbery.
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proved."'' 2 However, this statement was made with reference to
specific intent language in the 1874 amendment to the Illinois robbery statute, which included an increased penalty for robbery committed by one who is armed with a dangerous weapon "with the
intent, if resisted, to kill or maim." 22 By the time Hilderbrand was decided, the statute had been changed to eliminate this specific intent
element for armed robbery. 23 Therefore, the White court reasoned
that the language in Hildebrand concerning specific intent referred
24
not to the intent to steal, but rather to the intent to maim or kill,
an element peculiarly involved in the robbery statute in force from
1874 to 1919. Having concluded that the Committee Comments regarding the absence of a specific intent element in the pre-1961 robbery law were based on a "confusion" in the case law, the White
court chose to disregard these comments. 25 It relied, instead, upon
26
the prior comment to the effect that no change was intended.
The conclusion in White that robbery was a specific intent crime
prior to 196127 was based in part on the fact that larceny was a lesser
included offense, and that larceny was a specific intent crime. 28 The
court also relied heavily on People v. Ware.2 9 In Ware, the defen-

21. Id. at 555, 139 N.E. at 111.
22. Law of July 1, 1874, ch. 38, § 246, 1874 Rev. Stat. 348 (Hurd) (amended 1919).
23. The statute was changed to read: "or if he is armed with a dangerous weapon, or being
so armed he wounds or strikes.
Law of June 28, 1919, ch. 38, § 246, 1919 I11. Laws 426
(amended 1927).
24. 67 Ill.2d at 114, 365 N.E.2d at 341.
25. Id.
26. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
27. 67 Ill.2d at 115, 365 N.E.2d at 341.
28. The two cases discussed by the White court were Burke v. People, 148 Ill. 70, 35 N.E.
376 (1893), and Hall v. People, 171 Il. 540, 49 N.E. 495 (1898). In Burke the issue was the
sufficiency of the evidence offered to prove robbery. The indictment, it was decided, contained
sufficient surplusage to include both the crimes of robbery and larceny, but no evidence as to

the value of the property taken was on the record. The court concluded that the proof was
sufficient for robbery and that the value of the property need not be shown since it is only
material to the crime of larceny. 148 Ill. at 74-75, 35 N.E. at 377. In Hall the issue before the
court was whether the force allegedly used by the defendant to take the victim's pocketbook
was sufficient to sustain a robbery charge. Deciding that this evidence was lacking the court
reversed the conviction. 171 IU. at 544, 49 N.E. at 496. There is dicta in these opinions to the
effect that if the force or threat is not proved then the crime is that of larceny rather than
robbery. The Hall court, citing Burke, stated:
As distinguished from larceny from the person, the gist of the offense is the force or
intimidation, and the taking from the person, against his will, a thing of value belonging to the person assaulted. (Burke v. People. . . .) The only difference between
private stealing from the person of another, and robbery, lies in the force or intimi-

dation used.
Hall v. People, 171 11. 540, 542, 49 N.E. 495-96 (1898).
29. 23 Ill.2d 59, 177 N.E.2d 362 (1961).
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dant, an off-duty policeman armed with a revolver, inadvertently
failed to return a cigarette lighter taken from the complainant in the
course of an investigation. This case was decided under a pre-1961
robbery statute which proscribed "the felonious and violent taking of
money [or] goods." 30 The conviction was reversed on the ground that
there was no "felonious taking," since the defendant did not act "with
a criminal purpose." 3 1 From this holding the court in White concluded that the implication in the Committee Comments that the intent of the defendant is immaterial was therefore clearly erroneous. 32 Having decided the intent question, the court held that vol33
untary intoxication is a valid defense to robbery prosecution.
CRITICISM

The holding of People v. White rests upon two major premises: (1)
that robbery has always been a specific intent crime in Illinois; 34 and
(2) that the Criminal Code of 1961 did not eliminate the specific intent element. 35 As to the first of these premises, the court could not
cite any prior Illinois case explicitly holding that robbery was a
specific intent crime. 36 The court therefore resorted to dicta in Hall
v. People 37 for the proposition that robbery includes the lesser offense of larceny. 38 Since larceny is held to contain the element of
30. Law of July 8, 1927, ch. 38, § 246, 1927 I11. Laws 398 (repealed 1961).
31. People v. Ware, 23 III.2d 59, 62, 177 N.E.2d 362, 364 (1961).
32. 67 Ill.2d at 114, 365 N.E.2d at 341.
33. An Illinois statute provides explicitly that such a condition is a defense if it "[n]egatives
the existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §
6-3(a) (1975). This statute is a codification of a position held at common law and long followed by
the Illinois courts. See, e.g., Schwabacher v. People, 165 I11. 618, 629-30, 46 N.E. 809, 813
(1897); Bartholomew v. People, 104 IIl. 601, 606 (1882).
The problem of the intoxicated offender has influenced at least one court in determining
whether a given offense is a specific or general intent crime. See note 2 supra. However, the
concept of differentiating specific intent crimes from general intent crimes has been criticized
by many commentators as a poor device for dealing with the intoxicated offender. See, e.g.,
Beck & Parker, The Intoxicated Offender-A Problem of Responsibility, 44 CAN. B. REV. 563,
608 (1966); Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1066 (1944);
Hasse, Drug Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility: Old Dilemmas and a New Proposal, 16
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 249, 252-58 (1976).

34. 67 Ill.2d at 115, 365 N.E.2d at 341.
35. Id. at 117, 365 N.E.2d at 342.
36. Several cases have held to the contrary. See, e.g., People v. Cassidy, 394 I11. 245, 68
N.E.2d 302, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 769 (1946); People v. Johnson, 343 Il1. 273, 175 N.E. 394
(1931); People v. Bartz, 342 I11.56, 173 N.E. 779 (1930). However, these cases suffer the same
infirmity as People v. Emerling. They, too, have misread People v. Hildebrand. See notes 19-24
and accompanying text supra.
37. 171 I11.
540, 49 N.E. 495 (1898).
38. See note 28 supra.
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the specific intent to permanently deprive a person of his or her
property, 3 9 the court deduced that robbery would also require
specific intent. However, the validity of this conclusion is questionable. The cases relied upon in White involved fact situations in which
the sufficiency of the evidence of force or intimidation accompanying
the taking of property was in doubt, and these cases were resolved on
that issue. 40 Dictum indicating that if force or intimidation is not
adequately shown the crime committed is larceny rather than robbery is hardly dispositive of the issue of whether robbery contains all
of the elements of larceny.
The court could find but a single authority specifically interpreting
the words "felonious and violent taking," which appear in all pre-1961
robbery statutes. 4 1 That authority, People v. Ware,4 2 defined these
words to mean "with a criminal purpose" and "with the deliberate
purpose of committing a crime." 43 This reliance by the White court
also is questionable since there was no reference made in Ware to the
intent to steal or to deprive permanently. By the White court's own
interpretation44 of Ware, the defendant in that case acted "inadver4
tently" in failing to return the property of the complaining witness. 1
The. Ware holding leaves open the question as to whether the intent
to steal must be proven or whether a showing of some other criminal
intent will suffice, such as the temporary taking of property for use in
the furtherance of an unconnected crime. For instance, if the defendant in Ware had taken the cigarette lighter from the complainant
with the intent to use it in the commission of an arson, the Ware
court may have affirmed the conviction.
A more persuasive rationale that the White court could have
employed to reach its conclusion was suggested by the United States
Supreme Court in Morissette v. United States. 46 In that case the
defendant, charged with the offense of knowingly converting govern-

39. See, e.g., People v. Pastel, 306 Il.565, 568, 138 N.E. 194, 195 (1923); Bartholomew v.
People, 104 Ill. 601, 606 (1882); People v. Hargrave, 29 I11.
App.3d 89, 89, 329 N.E.2d 814,
814 (5th Dist. 1975); People v. Johnson, 136 Cal. App.2d 665, 673, 289 P.2d 90, 94 (1955). See
also ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-1(a)(1) (1975).
40. See People v. Williams, 23 1ll.2d 295, 178 N.E.2d 372 (1961); People v. O'Connor, 310
603, 125 N.E. 256 (1919); People v.
111.
403, 141 N.E. 748 (1923); People v. Jones, 290 111.
Ryan, 239 I11.
410, 88 N.E. 170 (1909); People v. Campbell, 234 Ill. 391, 84 N.E. 1035 (1908);
Steward-v. People, 224 III. 434, 79 N.E. 636 (1906).

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See notes 22, 23 & 30 supra.
23 lll.2d 59, 177 N.E.2d 362 (1961).
id.at 62, 177 N.E.2d at 364.
67 ll.2d at 111, 365 N.E.2d at 339.
People v. Ware, 23 1ll.2d 59, 62, 177 N.E.2d 362, 364 (1961).
342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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ment property, 4 7 had sought to interpose the defense that he had
honestly, though mistakenly, believed that the property had been
abandoned. 48 According to the Court, however, this defense would
be available only if the statute was construed as a traditional thefttype offense, 49 requiring specific intent to steal. The Supreme Court
decided that such a defense was valid, holding that, in the absence of
clear legislative intent to the contrary, a statute which adopts "a concept of crime already so well defined in common law and statutory
interpretation by the states" 50 will be construed to carry similar mens
rea elements. 51 Illinois law long has been in accord with this rule of
construction 52 and the Illinois Supreme Court has construed the
pre-1961 robbery statutes in accordance with common law regarding
other elements of the offense. 53 Thus, the old statutes could have
been interpreted simply to require the intent to steal in conformity
54
with common law.
The Illinois Supreme Court's reasoning regarding the legislative intent underlying the Criminal Code of 1961 presents some logical
problems as well. The court is on firm ground in finding the drafter's
reliance on People v. Enerling 55 misplaced, since that case was based
on a misinterpretation of precedent. 5 6 Furthermore, the comment in
the legislative history accompanying the 1961 amendments that "[n]o
change is intended" 57 clearly seems to indicate that the legislature

47. The statute under which the defendant was prosecuted provides in part:
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of
another . . . any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United
States . . . [sIhall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten
years . ..
18 U.S.C. § 641 (1970).
48. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 248-49 (1952).

49. Id. at 263.
50. Id. at 262.
51. Id. at 263.
52. In 1906 the Illinois Supreme Court held:
It is a familiar rule of construction that when a statute uses words which have a
definite and well known meaning at common law it will be presumed that the terms
are used in the same sense in which they were understood at common law .
O'Donnell v. People, 224 11. 218, 226, 79 N.E. 639, 642 (1906).
53. Id. at 226-27, 79 N.E. at 642 (construing the words "from the person" to include the
taking of property from a railroad station which was guarded by a watchman); People v. O'Hara,
332 Ill. 436, 440, 163 N.E. 804, 806 (1928) (construing "from the person" to include taking
property which is in the presence or under the immediate control of the person assaulted).
54. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
55. 341 Il. 424, 173 N.E. 474 (1930).
56. See notes 20-24 and accompanying text supra.
57. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
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did not believe that it was altering the intent element of the crime of
robbery. However, the conclusion that the legislators intended to include an element in robbery which they believed never existed does
not follow easily. Several appellate level cases construing the Illinois
robbery statute have held to the contrary. 58 Also, similarly worded
statutes have been construed by courts in other jurisdictions to define
robbery as a general intent crime. 59 The White court could have
followed this authority without violating the expressed intention of
the drafters of the statute.
IMPACT

The effects of the holding in People v. White will be both immediate and long-lasting. The instant consequence of the decision is
to cast doubt upon the indictments, complaints, and informations
filed in pending prosecutions. Because the holding is expressed in
retroactive terms, 60 past as well as current and future prosecutions
also will be affected. It may be contended that charging documents
not containing the allegation that the defendant had the requisite

58. See, e.g., People v. Whelan, 132 II. App.2d 2, 3-4, 267 N.E.2d 364, 365-66 (2d Dist.
1971); People v. Charleston, 115 Ill. App.2d 190, 198, 253 N.E.2d 91, 95 (1st Dist. 1969), rev'd
on other grounds, 47 ll.2d 19, 264 N.E.2d 199 (1970); People v. Marshall, 96 Il. App.2d 124,
127, 238 N.E.2d 182, 184 (1st Dist. 1968). See also cases cited at 67 lll.2d at 124, 365 N.E.2d
at 346 (Dooley, J., specially concurring).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 547 F.2d 36, 38-39 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v.
Klare, 545 F.2d 93, 94 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. DeLeo, 422 F.2d 487, 490-91 (1st Cir.
1970). These cases construed the Federal Bank Robbery Statute ("Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes . . . from the person or presence of another any property....
18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1970)) to require only proof of general intent. Contra, United States v.
Howard, 506 F.2d 1131, 1133 (2d Cir. 1974). See also State v. Thompson, 221 Kan. 165, 558
P.2d 1079 (1976). Thompson construed the Kansas robbery statute ("Robbery is the taking of
property from the person or presence of another by threat of bodily harm to his person or the
person of another or by force." KAN. STAT. § 21-3426 (1974)) as requiring only general intent.
The court compared the previous Kansas statute which was based on common law and required
a "felonious taking." 221 Kan. at 173-74, 558 P.2d at 1086-87. Accord, Traxler v. State, 96 Okla.
Crim. 231, 251 P.2d 815 (1952). Cf. State v. Klein, - Mont. -, 547 P.2d 75 (1976). Klein
construed Montana's robbery statute ("A person commits the offense of robbery if, in the course
of committing theft ..
." MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-5-401 (1974)) to require no specific
intent other than to purposely or knowingly put any person in fear of bodily injury, in spite of
reference to "theft" in the statute.
60. The holding in White clearly indicates the court's belief that robbery was a specific
intent crime both before and after the enactment of the Criminal Code of 1961.
[A]t the time of the enactment of the Criminal Code of 1961 intent was an element
of crimes of robbery and armed robbery. . . . [T]he General Assembly, upon
enactment of sections 18-1 and 18-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961, intended no
change in the existing law. . ..
67 Ill.2d at 115, 117, 365 N.E.2d at 341, 342.
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intent do not adequately charge the commission of the offense. 61 Redrafting and re-indictment may be necessary to correct these problems in cases still in pre-trial phases, 62 although it has been recognized in the past that indictments framed in statutory language are
sufficient. 6 3 Cases in more advanced stages may create greater difficulties. 64 Jury instructions must be altered as well. 65
Long-range ramifications include new defenses at trial, and corollary arguments raised on appeal and in post-conviction proceedings.
The inclusion of a specific intent element will significantly affect three
types of cases at trial: (1) those in which the defense is based on
negation of intent by intoxication or insanity; 66 (2) those in which the
requisite specific intent admittedly does not obtain; 6 7 and (3) those
involving situations in which the existence of intent may be unclear to
the fact finder. 68
61. See People v. Edge, 406 I11. 490, 493, 94 N.E.2d 359, 361 (1950); People v. White, 29
I11.App.3d 438, 438, 330 N.E.2d 521, 521 (5th Dist. 1975); People v. Huckaba, 23 I11.App.3d
555, 557, 319 N.E.2d 573, 575 (4th Dist. 1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 111-3(a)(3) (1975).
62. The statute of limitations is tolled by the original indictment. People v. Hobbs, 361 Ill.
469, 469-70, 198 N.E. 224, 224 (1935); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 3-7(c) (1975).

63. People v. Marshall, 96 I11. App.2d 124, 127, 238 N.E.2d 182, 184 (1st Dist. 1968).
64. See notes 66-114 and accompanying text infra.
65. Currently, Illinois juries sitting in robbery cases are read the statutory definition of
robbery, see note 8 supra, and then instructed as follows:
To sustain the charge of robbery, the state must prove the following propositions:
First: That the defendant took from the person or presence of ; and
Second: That the defendant did so by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force.
Illinois Pattern Instructions-Criminal §§ 14.03-.04 (1968).
For an example of a set of instructions which enunciate the specific intent element of robbery, see 2 DOWSEY, CHARGES TO THE JURY AND REQUESTS TO CHARGE IN A CRIMINAL CASE
IN NEW YORK 13-3 (1968):

Our Revised Penal Law defines robbery as forcible stealing ....
The gist of robbery
is the act of committing larceny by force. Before treating the question of force, I
will charge you on the law of stealing or larceny. If you do not reach a determination that defendant committed larceny, you must return a verdict of not guilty.
Under the Revised Penal Law, a person steals property and commits larceny
when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate such property to
himself or to a third party, he wrongfully takes, obtains and withholds such property from an owner, which includes a person having a right to possession thereof.
And if you find that the taking by defendant, even if effected by force, was for
purposes of borrowing with the intent of returning the property, you must render a
verdict of innocence of robbery.
66. See, e.g., People v. Herrin, 295 Il. App. 590, 592-93, 15 N.E.2d 598, 598-99 (4th Dist.
1938).
67. See, e.g., Traxler v. State, 96 Okla. Crim. 231, 251 P.2d 815 (1952) (temporary taking);
State v. Martin, 15 Or. App. 498, 516 P.2d 753 (1973) (debt collection). See also Annot., 46
A.L.R.2d 1227 (1956).
68. See, e.g., People v. Baker, 365 I11.328, 329-32, 6 N.E.2d 665, 667-68 (1936); People v.
Lardner, 300 I11. 264, 265-66, 133 N.E. 375, 375-76 (1921).
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. Negation of the mnens rea may be caused by some alteration of the
defendant's mental faculties such as intoxication or insanity. A look at
the cases involving other specific intent crimes will readily disclose
that the intoxication defense raised in White is frequently asserted. 69
The courts, however, take a strict view of this defense 70 and are very
reluctant to reverse convictions. In Illinois, for example, the intoxication must be severe enough to suspend totally the defendant's power
of reason and to render him incapable of entertaining the requisite
intent. 71 Insanity is a complete defense to any crime 72 regardless of
specific intent elements. It is unlikely, however, that a defendant
found sane would be allowed to present evidence of insanity on the
73
specific intent issue alone.
Cases in which intent to steal admittedly is not involved can be
characterized as either "debt collection" or "temporary taking"
cases. 7 4 An honest belief that one is legally entitled to the possession
of the property taken is a defense to theft, since a defendant holding
such belief cannot entertain the intent to steal. 75 Such a defense
now applies to robbery cases. 7 6 As to cases of "temporary taking" of
property by force or threat, if the defendant's intention is inconsistent

Prosecutions for felony-murder (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(a)(3) (1975))'in which robbery
is the underlying felony will be affected as well. If proof fails on the specific intent issue the
murder charge fails as well. See Commonwealth v. Graves, 461 Pa. 118, 334 A.2d 661, 665-66
(1975).
69. See, e.g., People v. Nugara, 39 lll.2d 482, 488, 236 N.E.2d 693, 697 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 925 (1969); People v. Miner, 46 I11.App.3d 273, 282, 360 N.E.2d 1141, 1148
(5th Dist. 1977).
70. See Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1236, 1246 n.20 (1966).
71. See People v. Fleming, 42 IlI. App.3d 1, 3, 355 N.E.2d 345, 347-48 (3d Dist. 1976);
People v. Pace, 34 III. App.3d 440, 446, 339 N.E.2d 785, 790 (1st Dist. 1975); People v.
Newlin, 31 11. App.3d 735, 739, 334 N.E.2d 349, 352 (5th Dist. 1975).
72. See People v. Britton, 119 II1. App.2d 110, 113, 255 N.E.2d 211, 212 (4th Dist. 1970);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2(a) (1975).
73. The degree of impairment required for a valid insanity defense is somewhat less than
that required for that of voluntary intoxication. A valid insanity defense requires only substantial
incapacity to appreciate the criminality of one's conduct or to conform one's conduct to the
requirements of the law rather than total suspension of power of reason which must be shown to
support an intoxication defense. People v. Pace, 34 111.App.3d 440, 446, 339 N.E.2d 785, 790
(1st Dist. 1975). See also People v. Walker, 33 I11.App.3d 681, 687, 338 N.E.2d 449, 453 (2d
Dist. 1975).
74. See note 67 supra.
75. See People v. Baddeley, 106 II1. App.2d 154, 158-59, 245 N.E.2d 593, 595 (1st Dist.
1969). See also Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 112 (1956).
76. Although prosecution for assault, battery, or intimidation may be appropriate, the sanctions normally will be reduced significantly. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 12-1 to 12-4,
12-6(a)(1) (1975).
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with permanent deprivation, a charge less serious than robbery will
77
be appropriate.
Ambiguous fact situations in which the defendant's possession of
the property is short-lived may present difficulties in proving the intent to permanently deprive. For example, if the facts show that the
defendant, after appropriating property through force or threat, disposes of the property shortly thereafter, a jury may be persuaded by
an argument which focuses on the permanency aspect of the specific
intent instruction.
The White case also will have an impact on prosecutions beyond
the trial stage. Following conviction, the defendant may seek to base
his quest for post-conviction relief on grounds revolving around the
intent element of the charge. Possible avenues for such a defendant
include post-trial motions, direct appeal, and collateral attack. 78
Arguments revolving around the intent element of robbery will add
new aspects to these attacks. Among errors which may be alleged in
post-trial motions or on direct appeal79 are insufficiency of evidence
on the intent issue, 80 improper exclusion of a material defense, 8 ' insufficiency of the indictment,8 2 and improper jury instructions.8 3 Any
of these points may be asserted in a motion for new trial. 8 4 In a
motion for arrest of judgment8 5 available grounds of relief are more
limited. Of the four errors listed above, only insufficiency of the indictment may be alleged in a motion for arrest.of judgment.8 6 If the
77. See, e.g., Traxler v. State, 96 Okla. Crim. 231, 240, 251 P.2d 815, 825 (1952). See also
Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 2, 1977, at 48, col. 1. A prisoner in juvenile detention center who
took a guard's keys by force to facilitate escape was indicted for armed robbery and aggravated
battery. Clearly, the prisoner's purpose was not to permanently deprive the guard of the keys.
Therefore, charges which carry less severe sanctions, such as escape (a Class 2 felony if committed by one incarcerated for a felony, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 31-6(a) (1975)), or aggravated
battery (a Class 3 felony, id. § 12-4(d)) rather than armed robbery (a Class 1 felony, id. §
18-2(b)) will be appropriate. Armed robbery is one of a small group of crimes for which a
sentence of probation is not permitted. Id. § 1005-5-3(d)(1). The weakening. of the State's position at plea negotiations without an armed robbery charge pending is obvious.
78. Leighton, Post-Conviction Remedies in Illinois Criminal Procedure, 1966 U. ILL. L.F.
540.
79. Id. at 541.
80. People v. Heiple, 29 Ill. App.3d 452, 454, 330 N.E.2d 556, 557 (5th Dist. 1975).
81. See People v. Klemann, 383 I11. 236, 239, 48 N.E.2d 957, 959 (1943) (intoxication evidence admissible on specific intent issue).
82. People v. Scholl, 339 I11. App. 7, 11, 88 N.E.2d 681, 683 (3rd Dist. 1949); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 111-3(a)(3) (1975).
83. See People v. Heiple, 29 Ill. App.3d 452, 453, 330 N.E.2d 556, 557 (5th Dist. 1975)
(jury properly instructed on elements of specific intent crime of burglary).
84. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 116-1 (1975).
85. Id. § 116-2.
86. Id. § 116-2(b)(1).
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specific intent element is not alleged in the indictment, such a motion is likely to succeed since, absent the requisite specific intent
allegation, the indictment does not properly charge an offense. 8 7 If a
reviewing court deems the denial of such a motion improper the conviction may be reversed without remand and the defendant dis88
charged.
In addition to post-trial motions and direct appeal, various forms of
collateral attacks are available to the defendant. These may be pursued through Section 72 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act 89 (statutory
writ of Corarn Nobis), 90 the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 9 1 or federal 9 2 or state 93 habeas corpus statutes. Since the White decision
casts doubt upon the validity of robbery convictions, one might
reasonably believe that such relief is available. An examination of
these forms of attack indicates, however, that they would generally
prove unsuccessful in challenging convictions for specific intent
crimes allegedly obtained due to a defect in the charging or proof of
the specific intent element. A brief discussion of these attacks may be
worthwhile, however, since many convicted defendants may contemplate such actions once having exhausted post-trial motions and
rights to appeal.
Proceedings under Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act are confined
to relief sought due to matters of fact, such as fraud, duress, or incapacity of the defendant, which if known to the court at the time
judgment was rendered would have prevented its rendition. 9 4
Therefore, any error of law with respect to specific intent could not
95
be asserted in such an action.
A second form of collateral relief may be sought pursuant to a petition filed in accordance with the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. 96 Such
a petition must be based on the allegation that the proceedings which
resulted in the conviction were tainted by a substantial denial of the

87. See People v. Edge, 406 II. 490, 493, 94 N.E.2d 359, 361 (1950); People v. Pronger, 48
Ill. App.2d 477, 480, 199 N.E.2d 239, 242 (1st Dist. 1964).
88. People v. Pronger, 48 I11.App.2d 477, 483, 199 N.E.2d 239, 242 (1st Dist. 1964).
89. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 72 (1975).
90. Leighton, supra note 78, at 563.
91. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122 (1975).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970).
93. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 65, §§ 1-39 (1975).
94. Jacobson v. Ashkinaze, 337 Ill. i41, 146, 168 N.E. 647, 649 (1929).
95. People v. Schuedter, 336 I11.244, 246, 168 N.E. 323, 324 (1929); Tinkoff v. Wharton,
344 I11.App. 40, 51, 99 N.E.2d 915, 920 (1st Dist. 1951).
96. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122 (1975).
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defendant's federal or state constitutional rights. 97 Since only violations of a constitutional character may be asserted, 98 an action filed
under this provision based on trial errors regarding the intent element to be charged in robbery would be improper and subject to
dismissal without a hearing. 99
The third type of post-conviction collateral proceeding is the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 1 0 0 Federal as well as state relief is
available to the state prisoner,' 0 ' but generally state remedies must
10 2
be exhausted before the federal action is filed.
In an Illinois habeas corpus petition, pertinent allegations are those
which question the jurisdiction of the sentencing court' 0 3 or those
which bring to the attention of the court any post-conviction occur04
rence which would render the petitioner's incarceration illegal.'
Until recent years an indictment which failed to allege an essential
element of the offense charged was ineffective to vest subject matter
jurisdiction in the trial court rendering judgment, 10 5 thus making a
conviction obtained on such an indictment susceptible to collateral
attack. 10 6 However, the Illinois Constitution 107 has been construed
It is still necessary that an indictto overrule that proposition. 10

97. People v. Thomas, 51 ll.2d 39, 41, 280 N.E.2d 433, 434 (1972); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 122-1 (1975). The deprivation of rights must have prejudiced the defendant to such a
degree that without the violation the outcome would have been different. People v. Logue, 45
ll.2d 170, 171, 258 N.E.2d 323, 324 (1970).
98. See People v. Clark, 48 Ill.2d 554, 557, 272 N.E.2d 10, 11 (1971) where it was held that
a petition which alleged lack of jurisdiction in the sentencing court and which required interpretation of a statute did not raise constitutional issues. See also People v. Fuca, 43 Ill.2d 182, 185,
251 N.E.2d 239, 24041 (1969) where it was held that a petition which alleged improper deprivation of the statutory right to a hearing in aggravation and mitigation did not allege a constitutional matter. Violations of statutory provisions which would render an indictment invalid are
also immaterial. People v. Ballinger, 53 Ill.2d 388, 389, 292 N.E.2d 400, 401 (1973). Equally
inappropriate are challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. People v. Christeson, 10 Ill.
App.3d 214, 215, 293 N.E.2d 138, 138 (4th Dist. 1973).
99. For a comprehensive discussion of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act and its relation to
other collateral actions, see Comment, Practice and Procedure Under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 8 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 129 (1974).
100. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 65, §§ 1-39 (1975); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1970).
101. See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 250 (1886). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1970).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970).
103. People v. Morris, 27 I1. App.3d 918, 922, 327 N.E.2d 507, 510 (3d Dist. 1975).
104. See, e.g., People v. McKinley, 371 Ill. 190, 198, 20 N.E.2d 498, 502 (1939) (prisoner
illegally transferred from reformatory to penitentiary); Eisen v. Zimmer, 254 Ill. 43, 47, 98 N.E.
285, 286 (1912) (payment made in satisfaction of judgment).
105. People v. Nickols, 391 Il. 565, 570, 63 N.E.2d 759, 762 (1945).
106. People v. Buffo, 318 I1. 380, 384, 149 N.E. 271, 272-73 (1925).
107. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. VI, § 9 (1971) (conferring jurisdiction on circuit courts over all
justiciable matters).
108. People v. Gilmore, 63 Ill.2d 23, 26-27, 344 N.E.2d 456, 458-59 (1976).
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ment charge an offense to withstand pre-trial motions to dismiss the
charge 109 and post-trial motions in arrest of judgment. 110 When attacked for the first time on appeal, an indictment need only be sufficient to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge and specific
enough to bar future prosecution."' Therefore, an indictment which
sets forth the offense of robbery as written in the statute, and which
particularly describes the time and place of the offense, 112 should
withstand collateral attack in an Illinois proceeding.
Federal habeas corpus relief is available in cases in which the
judgment of conviction is void for want of jurisdiction of the trial
court or where the conviction has been obtained in disregard of the
defendant's constitutional rights. 1 1 3 Since no constitutional or jurisdictional question is raised by the erroneous exclusion of a specific
intent element of an offense, it appears that the "Great Writ," 114 in
either its federal or state mode, will enjoy no greater utilization as a
result of White.
CONCLUSION

People v. White has clarified Illinois law regarding the offense of
robbery and has placed future legislative draftsmen on notice that
changes in common law crimes may be effected only through the
most carefully expressed design. 115 Although a new dimension has
been added to the trial and appeal of such prosecutions, 11 6 post-con109. Id. at 29, 344 N.E.2d at 460; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-1(8) (1975).
110. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 116-2(b)(1) (1975).
111. People v. Gilmore, 63 I1l.2d 23, 29, 344 N.E.2d 456, 460 (1976).
112. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 111-3(a)(4) (1975).
113. See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1941). In a state habeas proceeding constitutional issues are not relevant if they are non-jurisdictional in nature. People v. Woods, 47
Ill.2d 261, 263, 265 N.E.2d 164, 165 (1970); People v. Morris, 27 II1. App.3d 918, 924, 327
N.E.2d 507, 511 (3d Dist. 1975). Prior to 1949 and the enactment of the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act, see note 98 supra, constitutional violations apparently could have been the basis
for Illinois habeas corpus relief. See Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 237 (1949). For a chronicle
of the United States Supreme Court cases which precipitated the passage of the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act, see Jenner, The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 9 F.R.D. 347 (1949). Recent
decisions of the United States Supreme Court have somewhat limited constitutional attack in
the areas of illegal search and seizure and improper composition of the grand jury. See Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976). For an informative
sketch of the history of federal habeas corpus and an analysis of recent cases, see Robbins &
Sanders, Judicial Integrity, The Appearance of Justice, and the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus:
How to Kill Two Thirds (or More) With One Stone, 15 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 63 (1977).
114. The writ of habeas corpus often is referred to as the "great writ of liberty" or simply the
"great writ." See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 440 (1963); Ex parte Kelly, 123 N.J. Eq. 489, 497,
198 A. 203, 207 (1938).
115. See notes 55-57 and accompanying text supra.
116. See notes 60-88 and accompanying text supra.
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viction collateral actions appear to be unaffected. 117 The number of
post-trial motions and direct appeals should not increase, however,
since trial courts presumably will be handling the cases in accord with
White.
The echo of White may be heard in the General Assembly as well
as in the courts. Since it is likely that the legislative purpose underlying the drafting of the statute has been frustrated, new legislation
may be considered. One can see by reference to the majority opinion
how the legislature acted to eliminate a specific intent element from
the 1874 robbery statute."" That attempted clarification caused
confusion in the case law, 1 19 as have the 1961 Criminal Code revisions. In 1961 the state legislature apparently wished to simplify the
concept of mental states which are elements of crimes,' 2 0 and it may
wish to try again.
Edward J. Murphy

117.
118.
119.
120.

See notes 89-114 and accompanying text supra.
67 Il1.2d at 112-13, 365 N.E.2d at 340.
Id. at 112-15, 365 N.E.2d at 340-41.
See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-3 (Smith-Hurd 1972) (Committee Comments 254-55).

